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Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between finance and
marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which
enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral
hazard threatens this effect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are charac-
terized that induce efficient screening, while preventing moral hazard. “All-or-
nothing” reward-crowdfunding platforms reflect salient features of these mech-
anisms. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected gross returns exceed twice
expected investment costs. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underin-
vestment. With limited consumer reach, crowdfunders become actual investors.
Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial
financing, because each financing mode displays a different strength.
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1 Introduction
Crowdfunding has, in recent years, attracted much attention as an alternative mode
of entrepreneurial financing: through the internet many individuals — the crowd —
provide funds to the entrepreneur.1 In the context of “reward-crowdfunding”, this
crowd consists of the very consumers which the entrepreneur intends to target with
her final product. As a result, reward-crowdfunding leads to a transformation of
entrepreneurship, severing the traditional separation of finance and marketing.2
Figure 1 illustrates this transformation. In the traditional model, venture capi-
talist (or banks) attract capital from consumers to finance entrepreneurs, who sub-
sequently use this capital to produce goods and market them to consumers. In this
traditional model, finance and marketing are naturally separated and run along differ-
ent channels. Under reward-crowdfunding, finance and marking run along the same
channel: the crowdfunding platform.
The recent popularity of crowdfunding raises important questions about the eco-
nomic viability of this new entrepreneurial model and, in particular, about replacing
the financial intermediary.3 Economic theory provides clear efficiency arguments in
favor of a specialized financial intermediary. For instance, the seminal paper Dia-
mond (1984) points out that by coordinating investment through a single financial
intermediary, free-riding problems associated with monitoring the borrower’s behav-
ior are circumvented. Indeed, monitoring to limit a borrower’s moral hazard seems
especially important for entrepreneurial financing. Entrepreneurs are typically new
players in the market, who, in contrast to well-established firms, have not yet had
the ability to build up a reputation to demonstrate their trustworthiness.
1Time (2010) lists crowdfunding as one of the “Best Inventions of 2010”, while Economist (2012)
reports that the “talk of crowdfunding as a short-lived fad has largely ceased”. On the policy side,
the JOBS Act from 2012 and SEC (2015) set the foundations to raise capital through securities
offerings using the internet in the US.
2In contrast, “equity-crowdfunding” upholds the traditional separation between finance and mar-
keting, because the consumers and the crowd-investors are typically not the same economic agents.
3Mollick (2014) defines crowdfunding as “efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups –
cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contribu-











Figure 1: Traditional entrepreneurial financing (left) vs. reward-crowdfunding (right)
Hence, if crowdfunding is a viable alternative to traditional finance, it must pro-
vide relative efficiency gains from a different origin. This paper argues that it does in-
deed do so. Reward-crowdfunding provides a surprisingly effective way of addressing
the second main obstacle to entrepreneurial financing: reducing demand uncertainty
to allow a better screening of positive NPV projects.4
Indeed, outside investors deciding on a new entrepreneurial project face two basic
problems: 1) How to be sure that the entrepreneur will and can realize the intended
project and 2) how to be sure that the intended project generates enough consumer
demand so that it has a positive NPV.
The premise of this paper is that, while in the spirit of Diamond (1984) the tra-
ditional model has clear efficiency advantages in dealing with problem 1, i.e. dealing
with entrepreneurial moral hazard, the reward-crowdfunding model has clear ad-
vantages in dealing with problem 2, i.e. dealing with demand uncertainty.5 Before
illustrating this efficiency effect of crowdfunding by a simple example, we first discuss
how reward-crowdfunding in practise actually works.
Collecting funds of more than 1.5 billion dollars since its conception in 2009,
the most successful crowd-funding platform to date is Kickstarter. It implements
crowdfunding as follows. First, the entrepreneur describes her project, consisting of
the following three elements: 1) a description of the reward to the consumer, which is
typically the entrepreneur’s final product; 2) a pledge level, p, for each consumer; and
4Agrawal et al. (2014) mention this potential advantage of crowdfunding, but provide no formal
analysis. They also stress the problems of moral hazard in crowdfunding.
5Interestingly, one of the most successful crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, Pebble, first
applied for VC funding, but only received it after proving consumer demand through its crowdfund-
ing campaign: “What venture capital always wants is to get validation, and with Kickstarter, he
could prove there was a market” (Dingman 2013).
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3) a target level, T , which triggers the execution of the project. Second, consumers
pledge contributions, say ñ, and if the aggregate pledged contributions, ñp, exceed
the target level, T , the entrepreneur obtains the pledged contributions and must in
return deliver to each pledged consumer his or her promised rewards. If the pledged
contributions lie below the target level, the project is cancelled; consumers withdraw
their pledges and the entrepreneur has no obligations towards the consumers. Hence,
given a specified reward, the pair (p, T ) defines the crowdfunding scheme consisting
of a pledge level p and a target level T .
As a simple illustration of a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) that resolves demand
uncertainty, consider a “crowd” represented by only a single representative consumer.6
Suppose that the good’s value to this consumer is either high, vh = 1, or low, vl = 0,
each with probability 1/2. Let I = 3/4 represent the development costs which need to
be invested before the good can be produced. Abstracting from any other production
costs, the project has a positive NPV in the high valuation state vh, but not in the
low or the expected state of 1/2.
Hence, even if the entrepreneur had the required cash, she would not invest if she
cannot elicit the consumer’s valuation before hand; the project’s expected valuation
of 1/2 falls short of the investment cost of 3/4. Clearly, a venture capitalist facing the
entrepreneur’s business plan has a similar problem, even if, due to his experience with
similar projects, he may be a somewhat better judge of the consumer’s valuation than
the entrepreneur. The main point to see is however that the crowd-funding scheme
(p, T ) = (1, 1) resolves all demand uncertainty and screens out the positive NPV
project naturally. It even allows the entrepreneur to extract the project’s entire
surplus. Indeed, facing the scheme (p, T ) = (1, 1), the consumer pledges only when
v = 1 and the investment is triggered only in the high valuation state v = 1.
The extreme example not only illustrates the main efficiency effect of crowdfund-
ing, but also identifies three crucial ingredients which yield the economic benefit
of crowdfunding: 1) the presence of fixed development costs; 2) uncertainty about
whether the demand of consumers is large enough to recover the development costs;
and 3) a trigger level that enables conditional investment. The first two ingredients
6A single agent illustrates well the main, first-order effect of crowdfunding. Yet, it hides other
effective properties of the scheme: mitigating strategic uncertainty and coordination problems.
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are the defining features of entrepreneurial financing. The third ingredient is the
defining feature of a so-called “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding platform.7
Yet, counteracting this positive effect of crowdfunding is the problem of en-
trepreneurial moral hazard. How can a crowd ensure that the entrepreneur’s pro-
duces a final product that lives up to its initial promises, how can it ensure that the
entrepreneur does not squander the money, or how to prevent the entrepreneur from
simply making a run with the money after obtaining it?
An analysis of crowd-funding without explicit consideration of moral hazard prob-
lems seems therefore incomplete. As it turns out, this is the more so, because the
benefits of reducing demand uncertainty interacts directly with the moral hazard
problem: a reduction in demand uncertainty intensifies moral hazard.
In a nutshell, our formal analysis of optimal crowdfunding mechanisms yields the
following results: 1) Optimal mechanisms condition the entrepreneur’s investment
decision on the sum of reported consumer valuations. 2) Optimal mechanisms do not
require entrepreneurs to refund consumers so that consumers do not act as investors.
3) To reduce the threat of moral hazard, optimal mechanisms defer payments to the
entrepreneur. 4) Because the moral hazard problem interacts with the reduction in
demand uncertainty, optimal mechanisms resolve demand uncertainty only partially.
5) Because the moral hazard problem stands in conflict with the entrepreneur’s need
for capital, first-best efficient outcomes are unattainable if the ex ante expected re-
turns of the project are close to the entrepreneur’s ex ante expected capital costs. 6)
Constrained efficient mechanisms display underinvestment but not overinvestment.
Whereas result 5 and 6 are of a clear normative nature, the first four results are
positive. The “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding platforms reflect the 1st feature, while
all current reward-crowdfunding platforms reflect the 2nd feature. Apart from the
platform PledgeMusic, current platforms do not reflect the 3rd feature and currently
all crowdfunding platforms announce publicly the total amount of pledges, implying
they also do not reflect the 4th feature. These two latter observations confirm anecdo-
7Crowdfunding platforms using an “all-or-nothing” pledge schemes are, for instance, Kickstarter,
Sellaband, and PledgeMusic. The “keep-what-you-raise” model, where pledges are triggered even if
the target level is not reached is an alternative scheme that is popular for platforms more orientated
towards social projects such as GoFundMe.
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tal evidence that moral hazard is currently not a major issue, despite popular warn-
ings of the opposite. An extension of our model that captures the limited consumer
reach of current crowdfunding platforms, offers an explanation. Due to their limited
reach, a successful entrepreneur expects to sell her goods also to non-crowdfunding
consumers. This prospect acts as a direct substitute for deferred payments. Yet,
as crowdfunding becomes more popular and reaches more consumers, this effect will
decline. An increase in the popularity of crowdfunding therefore intensifies problems
of moral hazard. In line with out analysis, this may induce more platforms to follow
the example of PledgeMusic to introduce deferred payouts or, as also suggested by
our analysis, even limit the platform’s transparency in order to limit the threat of
moral hazard further.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the setup and identifies the main trade-offs.
Section 4 sets up the problem as one of mechanism design. Section 5 characterizes
constrained efficient mechanisms. Section 6 relates optimal mechanisms to real-life
crowdfunding mechanisms and examines extensions. Section 7 concludes. All formal
proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Being a new phenomenon, the literature on crowdfunding is still relatively small
and primarily of an empirical and case-based nature. Concerning crowdfunding’s
economic underpinnings, Agrawal et al. (2014) provide a broad introduction that
highlights the main issues. They emphasize entrepreneurial moral hazard with ex-
plicit quotes from the popular press. They also explicitly mention that crowdfunding
can reduce demand uncertainty, but do not study this aspect formally nor discuss
the features of crowdfunding schemes that are especially helpful in this respect.
Belleflamme et al. (2014) is one of the few theoretical studies that deals specifically
with crowdfunding. It addresses the question whether a crowdfunding entrepreneur
is better off raising her capital by reward-crowdfunding or by equity-crowdfunding.
Since the authors abstract from aggregate demand uncertainty, they do not identify
the economic benefits of reward-crowdfunding in screening out projects. Instead,
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the benefits of crowdfunding stems from their assumption that consumers obtain
an extra utility from participating in the crowdfunding scheme. In particular, they
study the extent to which the different crowdfunding schemes enable the monopolistic
entrepreneur to extract this additional utility.
The economic literature on demand uncertainty has mostly focused on its effect on
equilibrium prices rather than on its effect on investment decisions (e.g., Klemperer
and Meyer 1989, Deneckere and Peck 1995, Dana 1999). An exception is Jovanovic
and Rob (1987), who study the dynamics of innovation, when firms can acquire
information about the consumers’ evolving tastes and introduce product innovations
that cater to them. Even though these random evolving changes express demand
uncertainty, the paper is only tentatively related to the current study, because the
authors do not allow direct revelation mechanisms of the consumer’s preferences.
The marketing literature explicitly addresses a firm’s ability to reduce demand
uncertainty through market research such as consumer surveys (e.g., Lauga and Ofek
2009). Ding (2007) however emphasizes that consumers need to be given explicit
incentives for revealing information that reduces demand uncertainty. He especially
takes issue with the reliance of marketing research on voluntary, non-incentivized
consumer surveys. Interestingly, current crowdfunding schemes provide such explicit
incentives naturally.
Ordanini et al. (2011) present a marketing based, qualitative case study on crowd-
funding. They explicitly note that crowdfunding blurs the boundaries between mar-
keting and finance and view the consumers’ investment support as the foundational
trait of crowdfunding that sets it apart from other marketing theories. They mainly
study two equity- and a pure donation-crowdfunding scheme, but also report the
case of Cameesa, a Chicago based clothing company which in 2008 introduced an
“all-or-nothing” crowdfunding model similar to Kickstarter.
Empirical studies of crowdfunding try to identify the crucial features of crowd-
funding projects. Studies such as Agrawal et al. (2011) and Mollick (2014) focus on
the geographic origin of consumers relative to the entrepreneur. Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2013) show that social information (i.e., other crowdfunders’ funding deci-
sions) plays a key role in the success of a project. Focusing on equity-crowdfunding,
Hildebrand, et al. (2013) identifies an increased problem of moral hazard.
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3 Crowdfunding and the Information Trade-off
This section introduces the basic setup by expanding on the introductory example.
The entrepreneur
We consider a penniless entrepreneur, who needs an upfront investment of I > 0
from investors to develop her product. We assume that after developing it, the
entrepreneur can produce the good at some marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1). We also assume
that the entrepreneur is crucial for realizing the project and cannot simply sell her
idea to outsiders. This assumption marks our setup as an entrepreneurial one.
The crowd
The example of the introduction considered a representative consumer rather than a
genuine, i.e. uncoordinated crowd. In order to show that crowdfunding schemes also
deal effectively both with strategic uncertainty and potential coordination problems
within the crowd, we consider an uncoordinated crowd of n independent consumers
and denote a specific consumer by the index i = 1, . . . , n.
A consumer i either values the good, vi = 1, or not, vi = 0.
8 The consumers’
valuations are iid distributed with Pr{v = 1} = ν and Pr{v = 0} = 1 − ν.9 This
means that the number of consumers with value v = 1, which we express by n1, is







Since the marginal costs c are smaller than 1, we can take n1 as the potential demand
of the entrepreneur’s good and its randomness expresses the demand uncertainty.
Investing without demand uncertainty
Consider as a benchmark the case of perfect information, where the entrepreneur
observes n1 before deciding to invest. In this case, the entrepreneur can effectively
8The binary structure ensures that demand uncertainty expresses itself only concerning the ques-
tion whether the entrepreneur should invest or not and does not affect actual pricing decisions.
Subsection 6.3 discuss the implications of more general frameworks.
9The next section allows these probabilities to be consumer specific, but, in line with standard
mechanism design, upholds the iid assumption.
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condition her investment decision on the observed potential demand n1. It is so-
cially optimal that the entrepreneur invests if it is large enough to cover the costs of
production I + n1c, ie if








Pr{n1}[(1− c)n1 − I].
Note that by investing exactly when n1 ≥ n̄ and, subsequently, charging a price p = 1
for the good, the entrepreneur can appropriate the full surplus and this behavior
therefore represents an optimal strategy. Hence without demand uncertainty, the
entrepreneur’s incentives coincide with maximizing aggregate surplus and leads to an
efficient outcome.
Investing with demand uncertainty
Next consider the setup with demand uncertainty, i.e., the entrepreneur must decide
to invest I without knowing n1, if she subsequently wants to sell the good at some
price p. For given n1 and some price p > c, the entrepreneur’s profit is
Π(p|n1) =
 (p− c)n1 − I if p ∈ [0, 1];0 if p > 1.
Clearly, for any n1 the price p = 1 maximizes profits. It follows that expected








It is therefore profitable to invest only if Π ≥ 0. As the price p = 1 does not leave
any consumer rents, the entrepreneur’s profits coincides with aggregate welfare, but
in comparison to the case of perfect demand information either of two economic
distortions arise. For parameter constellations such that Π < 0, the entrepreneur will
not produce the good and, hence, the inefficiency arises that the good is not produced
for any n1 > n̄. For the parameter constellation Π ≥ 0, the entrepreneur does invest
I, but the inefficiency arises that she produces the good also for any n1 < n̄.
Crowd-funding
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We next consider the case of demand uncertainty but by crowd-funding the invest-
ment through consumers. This means that the entrepreneur commits to a pair (p, T ),
where p is the pledge level of an individual consumer and T is a target (or trigger)
level. As explained in the introduction, the interpretation is that if ñ consumers make
a pledge and the total amount of pledged funds, ñp, exceeds T , then the entrepreneur
obtains the total amount of pledged funds, invests and produces a good for each con-
sumer who pledged. If the total amount of pledges does not exceed T , then the
pledges are not triggered and the entrepreneur does not invest. Hence, investment
takes place when at least T/p consumers make a pledge.
It is again easy to see that crowd funding enables the entrepreneur to extract the
maximum aggregate surplus of S∗. For any p ∈ (0, 1], it is optimal for the consumer
to pledge p if and only if v = 1. As a result, exactly n1 consumers sign up so
that the sum of pledges equals P = n1p. Hence, the project is triggered whenever
T ≤ n1p. We conclude that the crowd-funding scheme (p, T ) with p ∈ (0, 1] yields
the entrepreneur an expected profit




A price p = 1 and a trigger level P = n̄ maximizes this expression, yielding an
efficient outcome and enabling the entrepreneur to extract the associated expected
surplus of S∗.
In comparison to the single agent examples of the introduction, it is worthwhile
to point out two additional features of the crowdfunding scheme. First, the crowd-
funding scheme circumvents any potential coordination problems between consumers.
This is because of the schemes second feature that for an individual agent strategic
uncertainty concerning the behavior and the private information of other agents do
not matter. Because of the scheme’s conditional pledge system which triggers the
consumer’s pledges only if enough funds are available, it is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for each individual consumer i to pledge if and only if vi = 1.
Moral hazard
The setup until now abstracted from any problems of moral hazard. Consumers
are sure to obtain the good as promised if their pledge is triggered. In practise,
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consumers may however worry about the problem of moral hazard and whether the
entrepreneur will in the end deliver a good that meets the initial specifications, or
whether they will receive some good at all. We can see all these different forms
of moral hazard as a weaker version of the problem that the entrepreneur simply
takes total pledges and does not invest at all. Clearly, if she could, she would do so,
because she is indeed better of running off with these pledges instead of incurring the
additional costs I + cP/p for realizing the project. In the face of such moral hazard
problems, rational consumers will not crowdfund the project and the crowdfunding
scheme collapses.
The root of this collapse is clear: the entrepreneur receives the pledged funds
before she actually invests and nothing after realizing the projects. Hence, one way
to mitigate this problem is to change the crowdfunding scheme such that the en-
trepreneur obtains the consumer’s pledges only after having produced the good. Such
a delay in payments is however possible only up to some degree because the penniless
entrepreneur needs at least the amount I to develop the product.
As a first step to address the moral hazard problem, we simply adjust our inter-
pretation of a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) as follows. As before, the price p represents
the pledge-level of an individual consumer and T the target level which the sum of
pledges, P , has to meet before the investment is triggered. Different from before how-
ever, the entrepreneur first obtains only the required amount I in order to develop
the product and she obtains the remaining part P − I only after delivering the good
to consumers.10
In order to see whether this alternative implementation of the crowdfunding
scheme prevents the entrepreneur from running off with the collected money, note
that the entrepreneur obtains the payoff I from a run and the payoff P − I − cP/p




We conclude that a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) = (1, 2I/(1 − c)) with delayed pay-
ments solves the moral hazard problem. For such a scheme, a consumer with value
10As explicitly stated on their website, PledgeMusic, a reward-crowdfunding site specialized in
raising funds for recordings, music videos, and concerts, uses a scheme with deferred payouts to
prevent fraud.
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v = 1 is willing to pledge p = 1 and the scheme leads to an equilibrium outcome
in which all consumers with v = 1 pledge and the project is triggered when at least
T consumers have the willingness to pay of 1, ie if n1 > 2I/(1 − c). Although the
scheme does prevent the moral hazard problem, note however that it does not attain
the efficient outcome, because its trigger level is twice as large as the socially efficient
one.
The information trade-off
Given the problem of moral hazard, a crowdfunding scheme with delayed final pay-
ments circumvents the moral hazard problem to some extent. Since this delayed
scheme does does not yield an efficient outcome, the question arises whether even
more sophisticated crowdfunding models exist that do better. To already give an
indication of this, note that even though we praised the role of crowdfunding as a
device to reduce demand uncertainty, the considered crowdfunding scheme actually
reduces it too much when there is also a moral hazard problem. Indeed, with respect
to choosing the efficient investment decision, the entrepreneur only needs to know
whether n1 is above or below n̄. The exact value of n1 is immaterial.
Yet, as inequality (1) reveals, the moral hazard problem intensifies if the en-
trepreneur obtains full information about P . As discussed, this inequality has to
hold for any possible realization of P ≥ T in order to prevent the entrepreneur to
take the money and run. Because the constraint is most strict for the case P = T , a




In contrast, if the entrepreneur would only learn that P exceeds T , but not the exact
P itself, then she rationally anticipates an expected payoff
E[P |P > T ]− I − cE[P |P > T ]/p
from not running with the money. Since the conditional expectation E[P |P > T ]
exceeds T , a crowdfunding scheme that reveals only whether P exceeds T can deal
with the moral hazard problem more efficiently.
Hence, in the presence of both demand uncertainty and the threat of moral hazard
the information extraction problem becomes a sophisticated one. One neither wants
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too much nor too little information revelation. In order to find out the optimal
amount of information revelation, we need to resort to the tools of mechanism design.
For this reason the next section sets up and studies the crowdfunding problem as one
of mechanism design.
4 Crowdfunding and Mechanism Design
In order to study the problem from the perspective of optimal mechanism design, we
first have to make precise the available economic allocations. Consequently, we first
describe the feasible economic allocation and, subsequently, discuss the mechanisms
that can induce the feasible allocations.
Economic Allocations
Crowd-funding seeks to implement an allocation between one cash-constrained en-
trepreneur, player 0, and n consumers, players 1 to n. It involves monetary transfers
and production decisions. Concerning monetary transfers, consumers can make a
transfer to the entrepreneur in two periods in time. In period t = 1, before the
entrepreneur has the possibility to invest and to develop the product, and in pe-
riod t = 2, after the entrepreneur has had the possibility to invest. Let ti1 denote
transfers of consumer i in period 1 and ti2 transfers of consumer i in period 2. Con-
cerning the production decisions, the allocation describes whether the entrepreneur
invests, x0 = 1, or not, x0 = 0, and whether the entrepreneur produces a good
for consumer i, xi = 1, or not, xi = 0. Consequently, an economic allocation a
is a combination (t, x) of transfers t = (t11, . . . , tn1, t12, . . . , tn2) ∈ R2n and outputs
x = (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ X ≡ {0, 1}n+1.
Feasible Allocations
By the very nature of the crowdfunding problem, the firm does not have the resources
to finance the required investment I > 0. It is therefore financially constrained.
As a consequence, the economic allocations in a crowdfunding problem exhibit the
following inherent restrictions. First, the firm cannot make any net positive transfers
to the consumers in the first period, and if it invests (x0 = 1), the transfers of
the consumers must be enough to cover the investment costs I. Second, aggregate
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payments over both periods must be enough to cover the entrepreneur’s investment
and production costs. To express these two feasibility requirements, we say that an
allocation a = (t, x) is budgetary feasible if
n∑
i=1
ti1 ≥ Ix0 ∧
n∑
i=1




Moreover, an entrepreneur can only produce a good to a consumer if she developed
it. To express this feasibility requirement, we say that an allocation a = (t, x) is
development feasible if, whenever the good is produced for at least one consumer, the
entrepreneur invested in its development:
∃i : xi = 1⇒ x0 = 1. (4)
This condition logically implies that if x0 = 0 then xi = 0 for all i.
Let the set A ⊂ R2n × {0, 1}n+1 denote the set of budgetary and development
feasible allocations, ie allocations that satisfy (3) and (4).
Payoffs
Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V = {0, 1}n represent the willingness to pay of the individual
consumers and let p(v) represent the probability of v ∈ V . We assume that vi’s
are drawn independently so that the probability over the values v other than vi is
independent of vi. As a consequence we can write this probability as pi(v−i).
A feasible allocation a ∈ A yields a consumer i with value vi the payoff
ui(a|vi) = vixi − ti1 − ti2;







cxi − Ix0 ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows directly from the second inequality in (3), implying that
any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff.
Efficiency
In our quasi-linear setup, an output schedule x ∈ X is Pareto efficient in state v if
and only if it maximizes the aggregate net surplus






(vi − c)xi − Ix0.
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With respect to efficiency, two different types of production decisions matter: the
overall investment decision x0 and the individual production decisions xi. Given
vl = 0 < c < vh = 1, efficiency with respect to the individual allocations requires
xi = vi. This yields a surplus of
∑




, V 0 ≡ {v :
∑
i
v < n̄};V 1 ≡ {v :
∑
i




we can fully characterize the Pareto efficient output schedule x∗(v) as follows. For
v ∈ V 0, it exhibits x∗0 = x∗i = 0 for all i. For v ∈ V 1, it exhibits x∗0 = 1 and x∗i = vi
for all i.11 Note that the efficient output schedule depends on the valuations v and
the ex ante probability that the project is executed is p∗.
Although transfers are immaterial for Pareto efficiency, we must nevertheless en-
sure that the efficient output schedule x∗(v) can indeed made be part of some feasible
allocation a ∈ A. In order to specify one such feasible allocation, we define the first
best allocation a∗(v) as follows. For v ∈ V 1, it exhibits xi = ti1 = vi = 1 and ti2 = 0.
For v ∈ V 0 a∗(v) is defined by xi = ti1 = xi = ti1 = ti2 = 0. By construction a∗(v)
is feasible and yields an ex ante expected gross surplus (gross of investment costs) of






p(v)vi(1− c) and S∗ ≡ W ∗ − p∗I. (5)
We further say that an output schedule x : V → X is development efficient if
x0(v) = 1⇒ ∃i : xi(v) = 1. (6)
This condition is the converse of development feasibility (4). If it does not hold, it
implies the inefficiency that there is a state v in which the entrepreneur invests I but
no consumer consumes the good. Although technically feasible, a schedule that is
not development efficient is not Pareto efficient, since it wastes the investment I > 0.
For future reference, the following lemma summarizes these considerations.
Lemma 1 The first best allocation a∗(v) is feasible and exhibits an output schedule
that is development efficient. It yields an expected net surplus of S∗.
11For
∑




i = 0 is also efficient, but this is immaterial (and can
only arise for the non-generic case that I is a multiple of 1− c).
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Mechanisms
We next turn to mechanisms. A mechanism Γ is a set of rules between the en-
trepreneur and the n consumers that induces a game between them. Its outcome is
an allocation a ∈ A with subsequent payoffs π(a) and ui(a|vi). We follow the idea
that the crowdfunding platform, as the mechanism designer, runs the mechanism; it
credibly commits to enforce the rules of the game which the mechanism specifies.
A direct mechanism is a function γ : V → A, which induces the following game.
First, consumers simultaneously and independently send a report vri about their val-
ues to the platform. Based on the collected reports vr and in line with the rules γ, the
platform collects the funds T1 =
∑
i ti1(v
r) from the consumers and transfers it to the
entrepreneur together with the recommendation x0(v
r) about whether to invest I. To
capture the moral hazard problem, we explicitly assume that the platform cannot co-
erce the entrepreneur into following the recommendation. That is, the entrepreneur is
free to follow or reject it. If, however, the entrepreneur follows the recommendation,
the platform enforces the production schedule x(vr) = (x1(v
r), . . . , xn(v
r)) and the
transfers ti2(v
r). If the entrepreneur does not follow the recommendation, but runs,
then individual production schedules are 0, and no second period transfers flow, ie
xi = ti2 = 0. Moreover, consumers forfeit their first period transfers ti1.
A direct mechanism γ is incentive compatible if its induced game as described
above has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which 1) consumers are truthful in that
they reveal their values honestly, ie vri = vi, and 2) the entrepreneur is obedient in
that she follows the recommendation, ie x0 = x0(v
r).









(ti1(vi, v−i) + ti2(vi, v−i))pi(v−i).
Consequently, we say that a direct mechanism γ is truthful if
viXi(vi)− Ti(vi) ≥ viXi(v′i)− Ti(v′i) for all i ∈ I and vi, v′i ∈ Vi. (7)
To formalize the notion of obedience, we define for a direct mechanism γ the set
T1 as the set of possible aggregate first period transfers which the mechanism can
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induce conditional on recommending investment:
T1 ≡ {T1|∃v ∈ V :
n∑
i=1
ti1(v) = T1 ∧ x0(v) = 1}.
Given this set we define for any T1 ∈ T1 the set V (T1) which comprises all states that
induce a recommendation to invest together with a total transfer T1:




Upon receiving a recommendation to invest, the entrepreneur has received some







if v ∈ V (T1);
0 otherwise.
We say that a direct mechanism γ is obedient if for any T1 ∈ T1 and after obtaining
the recommendation to invest, x0 = 1, the entrepreneur is, given her updated belief




p(v|T1)(ti2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I, for all T1 ∈ T1. (8)
We say that a direct mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is truthful
and obedient.
Note that crowdfunding schemes, which hand all transfers to the entrepreneur up-
front, exhibits ti2(v) = 0 for all i and v. Such schemes necessarily violate condition
(8) for any T1 ∈ T1. This formally confirms are informal discussion that such schemes
are unable to handle the extreme kind of moral hazard problems that we consider
here.
By its nature, participation in the crowdfunding mechanism is voluntary so that it
must yield the consumers and the entrepreneur at least their outside option. Taking
these outside options as 0, the entrepreneur’s participation is not an issue, because,
as argued, any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff. In
contrast, a consumer’s participation in an incentive compatible direct mechanism is
individual rational only if
viXi(vi)− Ti(vi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and vi ∈ Vi. (9)
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We say that a direct mechanism γ is feasible, if it is incentive compatible and
individual rational for each consumer.12 A feasible direct mechanism yields consumer
i with valuation vi the utility
ui(vi) ≡ viXi(vi)− Ti(vi). (10)





We say that two feasible direct mechanisms γ = (t, x) and γ′ = (t′, x′) are payoff-






′(v), vi) ∀i, vi;







An allocation function f : V → A specifies for any value profile v an allocation a ∈ A.
It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ such that the induced game has a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which the induced allocation coincides with
f(v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ implements f .
Likewise, an output schedule x : V → X specifies for any value profile v an
output schedule x ∈ X. It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ such that
the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which the induced
output coincides with x(v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ implements output
schedule x(·).
By the dynamic revelation principle, an allocation function f(·) is implementable
if and only if there exists a feasible direct mechanism γ with γ(v) = f(v) for any
v ∈ V . Likewise, an output schedule x(·) is implementable if and only if there exists
12This implicitly assumes that the mechanism has “perfect consumer reach” in that every con-
sumer is aware and can participate in the mechanism. As an extension that yields important
additional insights, Subsection 6.2 studies the effect of imperfect consumer reach.
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a direct mechanism γ = (xγ, tγ) such that xγ(v) = x(v) for any v ∈ V . The revelation
principle as usual motivates our focus on incentive compatible direct mechanisms and
allows us to demonstrate the following result.
Proposition 1 The efficient output schedule x∗(v) is, in general, not implementable.
The main driver behind the proposition’s inefficiency result is a tension between
the entrepreneur’s budget constraint and her moral hazard problem. For consumers
to make sure that the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give her
simply the required amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she must
also be given an incentive to actually invest this money. The proposition shows that,
in general, the solution to one problem precludes the other. As shown in the proof,
this occurs in particular, when the investment I is “close” to the potential revenue
of the project.
The proposition raises the question what output schedules are implementable. To
answer this question we have to investigate the mechanism design problem further.
The following lemma shows that with respect to development efficient allocations, we
may reduce the class of feasible direct mechanisms further.
Lemma 2 If γ = (t, x) is feasible and x is development-efficient then there is a
feasible and pay-off equivalent direct mechanism γ′ = (t′, x) with∑
i
t′i1(v) = Ix0(v),∀v ∈ V. (12)
The lemma implies that with respect to development-efficient mechanisms there
is no loss of generality in restricting attention to feasible direct mechanisms that
satisfy (12). Hence, we only need to consider mechanisms that give the entrepreneur
exactly the amount I if the entrepreneur is to develop the product. This also means
that the lemma makes precise the suggestion of the previous section that a mechanism
should provide the entrepreneur with the minimal amount of information for reducing
demand uncertainty; she should effectively only be told that the demand of consumers
ensures that the project has a positive NPV, but not more. The main step in proving
this result is to show that obedience remains satisfied when we replace different
aggregate levels of first period payments by a single one.13
13The lemma fails for specific development-inefficient mechanisms so that we cannot dispense with
the restriction to development-efficient mechanisms.
19
The lemma simplifies the mechanism design problem in two respects. First, under







Second, under condition (12), we have T1 = {I} so that the obedience constraint (8)





p(v|I)(ti2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I. (14)
5 Second-best crowdfunding schemes
In this section we characterize second best mechanisms γsb = (xsb, tsb) that maximize
aggregate surplus in the presence of demand uncertainty and moral hazard. We
are especially interested in determining and understanding the circumstances under
which these second best mechanisms do not implement the efficient output schedule
x∗.










(vi − c)xi(v)− Ix0(v)
]
. (15)
Clearly γsb cannot yield more than the surplus S∗ that is generated under the effi-
cient output schedule x∗. Indeed, Proposition 1 showed that, in general, we cannot
guarantee that γsb attains S∗. In this case, the second best output schedule xsb does
not coincide with x∗ and will display distortions.
As γsb is necessarily development-efficient, we can find γsb by maximizing (15)
subject to the constraints (7), (9), (12), (13), and (14), because these constraints char-
acterize the set of implementable allocation functions that are development-efficient.
A straightforward consideration of this maximization problem yields the following
partial characterization of γsb:
Lemma 3 The individual rationality constraint consumers with the high value vi = 1
does not restrict the second best mechanism γsb. The second best mechanism exhibits
xi(0, v−i) = 0, Xi(0) = 0, and Ti(0) = 0.
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It follows from the previous lemma that the second best mechanism γsb is a









(vi − c)xi(v)− Ix0(v)
]




p(v|I)(ti2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I (17)
Ti(0) = 0 for all i ∈ I (18)
n∑
i=1







xi(v) = 1⇒ x0(v) = 1 (21)
xi(0, v−i) = 0, ∀v−i ∈ V−i. (22)
Recalling that p∗ represents the ex ante probability that the project is executed
under the efficient schedule x∗, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The efficient output schedule x∗ is implementable if and only if W ∗ ≥
2p∗I.
Proposition 2 makes precise the parameter constellation under which the first best
x∗ is implementable: only if the efficient production schedule x∗ generates a surplus
that exceeds twice the ex ante expected investment costs.
As argued before, the main driver behind the inefficiencies is a tension between
the entrepreneur’s budget constraint and her moral hazard problem. For consumers
to make sure that the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give
her simply the required amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she
must also be given an incentive to actually invest this money. As the proposition
shows, this requires consumers to pay the entrepreneur the required investment I
twice. Once in order to finance the good’s development and, once more, in order
to prevent the entrepreneur from simply taking this money and run. To consumers,
realizing the project is therefore only worthwhile if the project’s revenue recovers the
investment I twice.
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Effectively, the proposition shows that the combination of the entrepreneur’s bud-
get constraint and her moral hazard problem lead to a duplication of the investment
costs. This prevent the first best outcome to be attainable if the expected gross
surplus W ∗ is too small.
Whenever the ex ante gross surplus does not cover for the expected investment
costs twice, the efficient output schedule, x∗, is not implementable so that the sec-
ond best output schedule xsb does not coincide with x∗. We next derive a partial
characterization of the second best and, more importantly, characterize the type of
efficiencies it exhibits.
Proposition 3 For W ∗ < 2p∗I, the constrained efficient output schedule xsb exhibits
xsbi (v) = vi whenever x
sb
0 (v) = 1 and x
sb
0 (v) = 0 whenever x
∗
0(v) = 0. Moreover,
xsb0 (v) = 1 whenever
∑
vi > 2I/(1− c).
The first part of the proposition shows that the constrained efficient output sched-
ules are only distorted with respect to the investment decision but not to the indi-
vidual assignments. The second part of the proposition shows that the second best
output schedule is distorted downwards rather than upwards. The final part shows
that at most the allocations for which aggregate valuations lie in the range between
I/(1−c) and 2I/(1−c) are downward distorted. Exactly which of these are distorted
downwards depends on the specific parameter constellation.
6 Interpretation and Discussion
This section interprets the optimal direct mechanisms as derived in the previous
sections and relate them to crowdfunding schemes in practise. It further discusses
extensions and robustness of the results.
6.1 Relation to crowdfunding in practise
A first notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they explicitly condition
the entrepreneur’s investment decision on the aggregate reported valuations rather
than each consumer’s report individually. This result confirms the intuitive ideas de-
veloped in Section 3. It is not only consistent with the “all-or-nothing” pledge schemes
22
of the popular reward-crowdfunding platform Kickstarter, but also many others such
as the music crowdfunding platforms Sellaband, which was already established in
2006, and PledgeMusic. We can interpret such schemes as indirect mechanisms that
implement such conditional investment optimally.
Interestingly, the “keep-what-you-raise” model, where pledges are triggered even
if the target level is not reached, is an alternative scheme that is popular for plat-
forms that are less orientated towards for-profit causes such as the donation plat-
form GoFundMe. Indiegogo, which markets itself as both a for-profit and non-profit
crowdfunding platform, lets the project’s initiator decide between the two options.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that for-proft projects are more prone to select the “all-
or-nothing” scheme.
A second feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they do not exhibit negative
transfers. Hence, at no point in time the entrepreneur pays the consumers any money.
In particular, the entrepreneur does not share any of her revenue or profits after the
investment. Consequently, optimal direct mechanisms do not turn consumers into
investors. This feature is consistent with reward-crowdfunding in practise. Indepen-
dently of the entrepreneur’s finale revenues, a crowdfunding consumer receives only
a fixed, non-monetary reward for his pledged contribution. Reward-crowdfunding
schemes such as Kickstarter actually explicitly prohibit financial incentives like eq-
uity or repayment to crowdfunders.14 The next subsection points out however that
optimal mechanism may require negative transfers if the consumer reach of the plat-
form is limited.
A third feature of optimal direct mechanisms is the use of deferred payments to
prevent moral hazard. Some but definitely not all crowdfunding platforms do so. For
instance, PledgeMusic, a reward-crowdfunding site specialized in raising funds for
recordings, music videos, and concerts, explicitly states on its Website that it uses a
sophisticated scheme with deferred payouts to prevent fraud.15 For its “direct-to-fan
campaigns”, which represent its reward-crowdfunding schemes, it actually uses three
payout phases: For a project that exceeds its target level, it pays 75% of the target
level (minus commissions) directly after the crowdfunding stage ends successfully.
14See https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer (last retrieved 22.7.2015)
15See http://www.pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud (last retrieved 20.07.2015)
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The remaining 25% of the target level is paid out upon delivery of the digital album,
while all funds in excess of the target level are paid out only upon successful delivery
of all other types of rewards.
The final notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they provide only
information about whether the sum of pledges exceeds the target and not the total
sum of pledges. In line with Lemma 2 any additional information is not needed to im-
plement (constrained) efficient outcomes and schemes that provide more information
may exacerbate the moral hazard problem. Current crowdfunding platforms do not
reflect this feature. Currently all crowdfunding platforms are fully transparent and
announce publicly the total amount of pledges rather than just whether the target
level was reached.
Despite of explicit concerns by the press, practitioners, and also the crowdfund-
ing platforms themselves, anecdotal evidence suggests that moral hazard is currently
not a major issue for crowdfunding platforms as actual cases of fraud are extremely
rare.16 As we discuss in the next subsection, one reason for this is the limited con-
sumer reach of current crowdfunding schemes. Due to the fact that crowdfunding
is still a rather new phenomenon and does not reach all potential consumers, a suc-
cessful entrepreneur can expect a substantial after-crowdfunding market and sell her
products to consumers who did not participate in crowdfunding. The entrepreneur’s
prospect to sell her goods to non-crowdfunding consumers acts as a substitute for
deferred payments and, therefore, mitigates moral hazard. As crowdfunding becomes
more popular and the after-crowdfunding market decreases, this substitution effect
diminishes. We investigate this aspect more closely in the next subsection.
6.2 Consumer reach and Crowdinvestors
In our formal analysis, consumers could only acquire the product by participating in
the mechanism and, by assumption, the mechanism is able to reach every potential
consumer. Given this latter assumption, the assumption that consumer can only ac-
quire the product through the mechanism is, by the revelation principle, without loss
16We are aware of only three campaigns on Kickstarter that indicated fraudulent behavior of
which one was stopped before the crowdfunding campaign was completed.
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of generality. This changes however when, for some exogenous reason, a mechanism’s
consumer reach is imperfect in that not all consumers can participate in it. In prac-
tise this seems a reasonable concern, because a share of consumers may, for example,
fail to notice the crowdfunding scheme, do not have access to the internet, or will
only arrive in the market after the product has been developed. Hence, a relevant
extension of our framework is to consider mechanisms, which, for some exogenous
reason, have an imperfect consumer reach.
Consider first a model with imperfect consumer reach, in which only a share of
β ∈ (0, 1) can take part in the mechanism. Already the pure proportional case that a
consumer’s ability to participate is independent of his valuation, yields new insights.
For the pure proportional case, the crowdfunding scheme is still able to elicit
perfectly consumer demand; a pledge by ñ consumers means that there are in fact
n1 = ñ/β who value the product. Consequently, investment is efficient if and only if
ñ/β ≥ I/(1− c)⇒ ñ ≥ n̄(β) ≡ βI/(1− c).
It is straightforward to see that the previous analysis still applies when we factor in
β. In particular, the efficient output scheme is implementable for W ∗ ≥ 2p∗Iβ.17
Even though our analysis readily extends to this proportional case, the interest-
ing economic effect arises that consumers become active investors when the share of
crowdfunding consumers β is small. To see this, note that, because the entrepreneur
needs the amount I to develop the product, the (average) first period transfer of a
pledging consumer needs to be at least I/ñ. When β is small in the sense that n̄(β) is
smaller than 1, it follows that for ñ close to n̄(β), the consumer’s first period transfer
exceeds his willingness to pay. Individual rationality then implies that the second
period transfer to the consumer must be negative in order to make it worthwhile for
the consumer to participate.
Since a negative second period transfer means that the entrepreneur returns part
of his first period contribution after the project is executed, such transfers imply that
17This “proportionality” property holds because the derived efficient scheme extracts all rents
from consumers and the entrepreneur can implement the efficient outcome by using the scheme as
derived and set a price p = 1 to the (1−β)n consumers who can only participate after the good has
been developed.
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the consumer effectively becomes an investor in the usual sense that he receives a
monetary return on his initial layout. Hence, with limited consumer reach, efficient
crowdfunding schemes may require consumers to become actual investors.
As noted, reward-crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit
financial incentives like equity or repayment to crowdfunders. Our formal analysis
confirms that this is indeed not needed if the investment I is small compared to
the number of crowdfunding consumers, but for large investments and crowdfund-
ing schemes with a relatively small consumer reach, such restrictions may matter.18
Probably the main reason that reward-crowdfunding platforms do not allow financial
incentives is due to regulation. Without any monetary flows from the entrepreneur to
crowdfunders, crowdfunding in the US is not an investment vehicle and does therefore
not fall under SEC regulation.
6.3 Elastic demand
Our formal model assumes that consumers’ valuations are of a binary nature. Con-
sumers either do not value the good (v = 0) or value it at the same positive amount
(v = 1). This assumption yields an inelastic demand structure and, more impor-
tantly, a framework in which demand uncertainty expresses itself only concerning the
question whether the entrepreneur should invest or not. This enabled us to clearly
illustrate crowdfunding as an economic institution that creates economic value by re-
ducing demand uncertainty and, thereby, identify the projects with a positive NPV.
Moreover, it allowed us to clarify that the “all-or-nothing”-pledge system of com-
mon crowdfunding platforms is in fact a crucial feature that enables the screening of
positive NPV projects.
An obvious modeling extension is to consider consumer valuations that are drawn
18Ordanini et al. (2011) report the case of Cameesa, a Chicago based clothing company which
in 2008 introduced an “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding model, but also shared revenue with its
crowdfunders. The company accepted pledges with a minimum of $10 from “Supporters” for
the production of T-shirts designs and a target level of $500, which cumulative pledges needed
to reach before the T-shirt was produced. Any Supporter who pledged in a failing design
got their money back, while Supporters of a successful design not only obtained the shirt,
but also shared in some of the revenue of its future sales. (see http://www.cnet.com/news/
cameesa-a-threadless-where-customers-are-also-investors/, last retrieved 22.7.2015).
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from more than two states or with different supports. In this case, aggregate de-
mand will be elastic and demand uncertainty expresses itself not only in the question
whether to invest but also in the question what price (or pledge level) to set. Hence,
resolving demand uncertainty also allows the entrepreneur to pick the right price.
Economist (2010) reports of a concrete example of a book publisher planning to
funding the republication of a sold-out book: ”his efforts to tease out lenders’ price
sensitivity from previous Kickstarter projects showed that a $50 contribution was the
most popular amount. It also proved the largest dollar component for the highest-
grossing Kickstarter projects.” Because the current paper focuses on economic effi-
ciency rather than revenue extraction, we only mention this ability of crowdfunding
schemes without exploring this idea formally.
7 Conclusion
Reward-crowdfunding severs the traditional separation of finance and marketing and
thereby fundamentally changes the organizational model of entrepreneurship. This
new model has the clear economic advantage over the traditional one that it elicits
demand information directly from consumers in an incentive compatible way. It
thereby allows a better screening of positive NPV projects.
Due to the free friding problem that individual crowdfunders have reduced incen-
tives to monitor as compared to the crowd as a whole, the threat of entrepreneurial
moral hazard may potentially counter this effect.
Posing the subsequent economic problem as one of optimal mechanism design
and interpreting crowdfunding platforms as institutions that execute the mechanism,
offers an explanation for some salient features of current reward-crowdfunding plat-
forms. Most importantly, the popularity of “all-or-noting” pledging schemes. Yet.
also the feature that reward-crowdfunding platforms do not ask their crowdfunders
to become genuine investors who obtain some share of the project’s revenues is con-
sistent with our analysis if such platform reach enough consumers.
Despite their effectiveness in eliciting demand information, the moral hazard prob-
lem may prevent the implementation of fully efficient outcomes in that efficiency is
sustainable only if a project’s ex ante expected gross return exceeds its ex ante ex-
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pected investment costs at least twice. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit
underinvestment.
Whereas current crowdfunding platforms reflect the properties of optimal mecha-
nisms that deal with demand uncertainty, they do not seem to reflect the properties
of mechanisms that deal with moral hazard optimally. This confirms anecdotal evi-
dence that moral hazard in crowdfunding is currently rare, despite popular warnings
of the opposite. We attribute this to the prospect of a successful entrepreneur to
sell her goods also to non-crowdfunding consumers, because this prospect acts as a
direct substitute for deferred payments. As the popularity of crowdfunding grows,
this effect declines and the problem of entrepreneurial moral hazard may require plat-
forms to follow the example of PledgeMusic to introduce deferred payouts or, as also
suggested by our analysis, even limit the platform’s transparency.
Because crowdfunding schemes by themselves are, in the presence of moral hazard,
unable to attain efficiency in general, we point out that the main conclusion to be
drawn from our analysis is broader. Indeed, because the main economic advantages
of traditional venture capitalists and crowdfunding lie in different dimensions, the
two financing models are complements rather than substitutes. In other words, we
expect a convergence of the two models of entrepreneurship, especially, as the prob-
lem of moral hazard in crowdfunding rises — which as explained we expect when
crowdfunding becomes more and more main stream.19 Current regulatory policies
measures such as the US JOBS Act and its implementation in SEC (2015) will make
such mixed forms of crowdfunding and more traditional venture capitalism easier to
develop so that one can take advantage of their respective strengths. The website of
the crowdfunding platform Rockethub already explicitly mentions this possible effect
of the JOBS Act.20
19As mentioned in footnote 5, an explicit example of such potential convergence is the case of
Pebble, which first obtained VC backing after its crowdfunding campaign.
20See http://www.rockethub.com/education/faq#jobs-act-index (last retrieved 22.7.2015).
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Appendix
This appendix collects the formal proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows directly from the text Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: It is sufficient to demonstrate the result in a specific
parameterization of the model. Let I = n − 1/2 and c = 0 and let 1n denote the
vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn.
Since n̄ = I/(1− c) = n− 1/2, the efficient output schedule exhibits x0 = xi = 0
for v 6= 1n, and x0 = xi = 1 for v = 1n. We show by contradiction that a feasible
direct mechanism that implements the efficient output schedule x∗(v) does not exist.
For suppose to the contrary that such a direct mechanism does exist, then the
entrepreneur’s Bayes’ consistent beliefs after a recommendation to invest, x0 = 1, is
degenerated, because x∗0(v) equals 1 only if v = 1
n. Hence, the entrepreneur puts




n)p(1n) ≥ Ip(1n). (23)
Since x0(1




n)p(1n) ≥ Ip(1n). (24)
Note further that (3) for each v 6= 1n implies
n∑
i=1
ti1(v) + ti2(v) ≥ 0 (25)




(ti1(v) + ti2(v))p(v) ≥ 0 (26)




(ti1(v) + ti2(v))p(v) ≥ 2Ip(1n) = (2n− 1)p(1n), (27)
where the equality uses I = n− 1/2.
We now show that (27) contradict the consumers’ individual rationality. Since
Xi(0) = 0, (9) for vi = 0 implies after a multiplication by pi(0) for each i∑
v−i∈V−i
(ti1(0, v−i) + ti2(0, v−i))p(0, v−i) ≤ 0. (28)
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(ti1(0, v−i) + ti2(0, v−i))p(0, v−i) ≤ 0. (29)
Likewise, since Xi(1) = pi(1
n−1), (9) for vi = 1 implies after a multiplication with
pi(1) that for each i∑
v−i∈V−i
(ti1(1, v−i) + ti2(1, v−i))p(1, v−i) ≤ p(1n). (30)




(ti1(1, v−i) + ti2(1, v−i))p(1, v−i) ≤ p(1n)n. (31)




(ti1(v) + ti2(v))p(v) ≤ p(1n)n. (32)
But since 2n− 1 > n, this contradicts (27). Q.E.D.





Then since γ = (t, x) is feasible, it satisfied (3) and it therefore holds K(v) ≥ 0
for all v ∈ V . For any state v, let n(v) ≡
∑
i xi(v) represent the total number
of consumers with xi = 1. For any state v with x0(v) = 0, define t
′
i1(v) = 0 and
t′i2(v) = ti1(v) + ti2(v). For x0(v) = 1 define t
′
i1(v) = ti1(v) − xi(v)K(v)/n(v) and
t′i2(v) = ti2(v) + xi(v)K(v)/n(v). Since x is development efficient, it holds n(v) > 0
if and only if x0(v) = 1. Hence, the transformed transfer schedule t
′ is well-defined




i1(v) = 0 for any v with






i ti1(v) − xi(v)K(v)/n(v) =
∑
i ti1(v) − K(v) = I for
any v with x0(v) = 1. Hence, the allocation (t
′(v), x(v)) satisfies (12). Because
the allocation (t(v), x(v)) is development feasible, also the allocation (t′(v), x(v)) is
development feasible. Moreover, from t′i1(v) + t
′
i2(v) = ti1(v) + ti2(v) it follows that
(t′, x) is also budgetary feasible, truthtelling, and individual rational for consumers,
given that (t, x) is so by assumption.
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In order to show that (t′, x) is feasible, it only remains to show that it is obedient,





Now since, γ = (t, x) is obedient by assumption, (8) holds for any T1 ∈ T and, since




p(v|T1)P (T1)(t′i2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I · P (T1). (33)
By definition of p(v|T1) we have p(v|T1)P (T1) = p(v)1v∈V (T1), where 1A is the indi-
cator function which is 1 if the statement A is true and 0 otherwise. Thus we may







i2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I · P (T1). (34)











I · P (T1), (35)







i2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I · P (∪T1∈T1T1), (36)
where V ′ and P ′ are the respective sets V and probability P under the mechanism
γ′. Since for any T1 ∈ T1 and v such that x0(v) = 1, we have by construction that∑
i t
′










i2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ IP ′(I), (37)





p′(v|I)(t′i2(v)− cxi(v)) ≥ I · P ′(I), (38)
and shows that γ′ = (t′, x) is obedient. To complete the proof note that since t′i1(v)+
t′i2(v) = ti1(v) + ti2(v), the feasible direct mechanism γ
′ = (t′, x) is payoff equivalent
to original mechanism γ = (t, x). Q.E.D.
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Proof of lemma 3: The first statement follows because, as usual, the incentive con-
straint of a consumer with value vi = 1 and the individual rationality of a consumer
with value v = 0 imply the individual rationality of a consumer with value v = 1.
To see xi(0, v−i) = 0, note that if not, then xi(0, v−i) = 1. But then lowering it
to 0 raises the efficiency objective by p(0, v−i)c, while relaxing all other constraints.
The statement Xi(0) = 0 follows as a corollary.
To see Ti(0) = 0, note that if not then we raise all ti2(0, v−i) and ti2(1, v−i) by
ε > 0. This relaxes constraints and does not affect objective.
To see Ti(1) = Xi(1). If not then raise all ti2(1, v−i) by ε > 0. This relaxes
constraints and does not affect objective. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Define
p∗(v) ≡
 p(v)/p∗ if x∗0(v) = 1;0 otherwise,
where we recall that p∗ is the ex ante probability that the entrepreneur invests under




p∗(v)vi(1− c) ≥ 2I. (39)
We first proof that under condition (39) the first best is implementable by con-
structing a transfer schedule t∗ such that the direct mechanism γ∗ = (t∗, x∗) is in-
centive compatible and therefore implements x∗. For any v such that x∗0(v) = 0, set
t∗i1(v) = t
∗
i2(v) = 0. For any v such that x
∗





i (v) > 0 represents




and t∗i2(v) = x
∗
i (v)(1− I/x̄∗(v)).
We show that the resulting direct mechanism γ∗ is feasible, ie. satisfies (3), (7),
(8), and (9) for each v ∈ V .

















i (v), since x
∗
i (v) = 0 for all i whenever x
∗
0(v) =

































i vi ≥ I +
∑







21x̄∗(v) is greater than 0, since x∗0(v) = 1 and x
∗ is development-efficient.
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where the inequality holds because x∗(0) = 1 is efficient by assumption so that∑
i vi ≥ I +
∑
i cvi.
To show (9) and (7) note that x∗ exhibits x∗i (0) = 0 so that X
∗
i (0) = 0 and
T ∗i (0) = 0. Moreover, X
∗
i (1) ≥ 0 and T ∗i (1) ≥ 0. For vi = 0, it therefore follows
viX
∗
i (vi)−T ∗i (vi) = 0·X∗i (0)−T ∗i (0) = 0 ≤ −T ∗i (1) = 0·X∗1 (1)−T ∗i (1) so that (7) and
(9) are satisfied for vi = 0. To see that (9) and (7) are also satisfied for the other case





i (1, v−i)−t∗i1(1, v−i)−t∗i2(1, v−i)] =
0 = 1 ·X∗i (0)− T ∗i (0).
Finally, to show (8), first note that for γ∗ we have T ∗1 = {I} and p(v|I) = p∗(v)




















p∗(v)(1− c)− I ≥ 2I − I = I, (41)




∗(v)vi(1− c) ≥ 2I.




p∗(v)vi(1− c) < 2I (42)
there does not exist a transfer schedule t such that the direct mechanism γ = (t, x∗)
is feasible. In particular, we show there does not exist a transfer schedule t such that
(t, x∗) satisfies (16)-(22).
For the efficient output schedule x∗ it holds V 1 = {v|x∗0(v) = 1} and V 0 =
{v|x∗0(v) = 0} so that V = V 1 ∪ V 0.
For v ∈ V 0, it moreover holds xi(v) = 0 so that conditions (19) and (20) taken
together imply
∑
i ti1(v) + ti2(v) ≥ 0. Multiplying by p(v) and summing up over all




p(v)[ti1(v) + ti2(v)] ≥ 0 (43)
For v ∈ V 1, condition (19) implies
∑
i ti1(v) = I. Multiplying by p(v) and sum-







p(v)I = p∗I (44)
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i (1, v−i) (50)











i (0, v−i), (51)
because x∗i (0, v−i) = 0.










but this contradicts (49). Hence, under (42) there does not exist a combination (t, x∗)
which satisfies (16)-(22) and, hence, x∗ is not implementable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: To show the first statement, suppose for some consumer i
we have xsbi (1, v−i) = 0 6= vi. By (22), we have xsbi (0, v−i) = 0 so that for consumer i
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it must hold vi = 1. But then by raising xi(1, v−i) to 1 and increasing ti2(1, v−i) by c,
the objective is raised by p(1, v−i)(1− c) > 0, while none of the constraints (16)-(22)
are affected.
To show the second statement, suppose xsb0 (v) = 1, while x
∗
0(v) = 0. Then by
setting it to 0 and setting xsbi (v) = 0, the changed direct mechanism satisfies all
constraints (16)-(22) if the original one satisfied them. The change in xsb0 (v) raises
the objective by I and the (possible) change in xsbi (v) lowers the objective by at most
vi(1−c). So the total raise in the objective it at least I−
∑
i vi(1−c). This is strictly
positive, because x∗0(v) = 0 implies
∑
i vi(1− c) < I.
To show the final statement, suppose (x̃, t̃) is such that it satisfies (16)-(22) while
there is a v̂ such that x̃0(v̂) = 0, while v̄ =
∑
vi > 2I/(1− c). We show that (x̃, t̃) is
not a second best solution since there exists a (x̂, t̂) that also satisfies (16)-(17) but
yields a strictly higher surplus.
To see this define (x̂, t̂) as follows. For all v 6= v̂ set x̂0(v) = x̃0(v), x̂i(v) = x̃i(v),
t̂i1(v) = t̃i1(v), and t̂i2(v) = t̃i2(v). Moreover, set x̂i(v̂) = v̂i, t̂i1(v̂) = v̂i · I/v̄ + t̃i1(v̂),
and t̂i2(v̂) = v̂i(1− I/v̄) + t̃i2(v̂). Hence (x̂, t̂) differs from (x̃, t̃) only concerning v̂.










(1− c)v̂i − I
]
= p(v̂)[(1−c)v̄−I] > 0.
It remains to be checked that (x̂, t̂) satisfies (16)-(22). That it satisfies (16), (18),
(21) and (22) follows directly, because (x̃, t̃) satisfies these constraints and (x̂, t̂) is a
transformation of (x̃, t̃) which preserves them.
Since (19) holds for (x̃, t̃), it clearly holds for (x̂, t̂) with respect to all v 6= v̂. That





v̂i · I/v̄ + t̃i1(v̂) = v̄I/v̄ + Ix̃0(v̂) = I = Ix̂0(v̂).












where the first inequality uses that (x̃, t̃) satisfies (20) so that
∑
i ti2(v̂) ≥ 0, as
x̃i(v̂) = 0, and the second inequality follows from v̄ > 2I/(1 − c), as this implies
c < 1− I/v̄.
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(v̂i(1− I/v̄) + t̃i2(v̂)− cv̂i) ≥
∑
i
v̂i(1− I/v̄ − c) = v̄(1− I/v̄ − c) = v̄(1− c)− I > I,





0, and the final inequality uses v̄ > 2I/(1− c).
Since (x̃, t̃) satisfies (17) it follows from the definition of p(v|I) that it is equivalent
to ∑
v∈Ṽ 1




so that with the former inequality it follows∑
v∈Ṽ 1




But since V̂ 1 = Ṽ 1 ∪ {v̂}, this is equivalent to∑
v∈V̂ 1




which is equivalent to saying that (17) holds with respect to (x̂, t̂). Q.E.D.
36
References
Agrawal, A., C. Catalini, and A. Goldfarb, (2011). “The geography of crowdfund-
ing,” NBER Working Paper 16820.
Agrawal, A., C. Catalini, and A. Goldfarb, (2014) “Some Simple Economics of
Crowdfunding,” Innovation Policy and the Economy 14, 63-97.
Belleflamme, P., T. Lambert, and A. Schwienbacher (2014), “Crowdfunding: Tap-
ping the right crowd,” Journal of Business Venturing 29, 585-609.
Dana, J., (1999). “Equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty: The
roles of costly capacity and market structure,” Rand Journal of Economics 30,
632-660.
Deneckere, R. and J. Peck (1995). “Competition over Price and Service Rate when
Demand Is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis,” Rand Journal of Economics 26,
148-161.
Diamond, D., (1984). “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review
of Economic Studies 51, 393-414.
Ding, M., (2007). “An Incentive-Aligned Mechanism for Conjoint Analysis,” Journal
of Marketing Research 44, 214223
Dingman, S., (2013). “Canadian’s smartwatch startup matches record $15-million
in VC funding” The Globe and Mail 16.5.2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/technology/business-technology/canadians-smartwatch-startup-matches-record-15-million-in-vc-funding/
article11965214/ (last retrieved 25.07.2015).
Economist, (2010). “The micro-price of micropatronage”, 27.9.2010, http://www.
economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/micropatronage_sweet_spot?fsrc=
nwl (last retrieved 22.07.2015).
Economist, (2012). “Raising capital online - The new thundering her,” 16.06.2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21556973 (last retrieved 20.07.2015).
37
Hildebrand, T., M. Puri, and J. Rocholl, (2013). “Adverse incentives in crowdfund-
ing,” Working Paper ESMT Berlin.
Jovanovic, B. and R. Rob, (1987). “Demand-driven innovation and spatial compe-
tition over time,” Review of Economic Studies 54, 6372.
Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer, (1989). “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
Under Uncertainty,” Econometrica 89 1243-1277.
Kuppuswamy, V., and B. Bayus, (2013). “Crowdfunding creative ideas: The dy-
namics of project backers in Kickstarter,” mimeo, University of North Carolina.
Lauga, D., and E. Ofek, (2009).“Market Research and Innovation Strategy in Duopoly,”
Marketing Science 28(2), 373-396.
Mollick, E., (2014). “The dynamics of crowdfunding: Determinants of success and
failures,” Journal of Business Venturing 29, 1-16.
SEC, (2015). “SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies Access to Capital
New Rules Provide Investors With More Investment Choices”, http://www.
sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html (last retrieved 20.07.2015).
Time, (2010). “The 50 Best Inventions of 2010” 11.11.2010, http://content.time.
com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2029497_2030652_2029823,






SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2015 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 




001 "Pricing Kernel Modeling" by Denis Belomestny, Shujie Ma and Wolfgang 
Karl Härdle, January 2015. 
002 "Estimating the Value of Urban Green Space: A hedonic Pricing Analysis 
of the Housing Market in Cologne, Germany" by Jens Kolbe and Henry 
Wüstemann, January 2015. 
003 "Identifying Berlin's land value map using Adaptive Weights Smoothing" 
by Jens Kolbe, Rainer Schulz, Martin Wersing and Axel Werwatz, January 
2015. 
004 "Efficiency of Wind Power Production and its Determinants" by Simone 
Pieralli, Matthias Ritter and Martin Odening, January 2015. 
005 "Distillation of News Flow into Analysis of Stock Reactions" by Junni L. 
Zhang, Wolfgang K. Härdle, Cathy Y. Chen and Elisabeth Bommes, Janu-
ary 2015. 
006 "Cognitive Bubbles" by Ciril Bosch-Rosay, Thomas Meissnerz and Antoni 
Bosch-Domènech, February 2015. 
007 "Stochastic Population Analysis: A Functional Data Approach" by Lei 
Fang and Wolfgang K. Härdle, February 2015. 
008 "Nonparametric change-point analysis of volatility" by Markus Bibinger, 
Moritz Jirak and Mathias Vetter, February 2015. 
009 "From Galloping Inflation to Price Stability in Steps: Israel 1985–2013" 
by Rafi Melnick and till Strohsal, February 2015. 
010 "Estimation of NAIRU with Inflation Expectation Data" by Wei Cui, Wolf-
gang K. Härdle and Weining Wang, February 2015. 
011 "Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also 
Listened To?" by Thomas Giebe and Miyu Lee, February 2015. 
012 "The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication" by 
Daniel Streitz, March 2015. 
013 "Pitfalls and Perils of Financial Innovation: The Use of CDS by Corporate 
Bond Funds" by Tim Adam and Andre Guettler, March 2015. 
014 "Generalized Exogenous Processes in DSGE: A Bayesian Approach" by 
Alexander Meyer-Gohde and Daniel Neuhoff, March 2015. 
015 "Structural Vector Autoregressions with Heteroskedasticy" by Helmut 
Lütkepohl and Aleksei Netšunajev, March 2015. 
016 "Testing Missing at Random using Instrumental Variables" by Christoph 
Breunig, March 2015. 
017 "Loss Potential and Disclosures Related to Credit Derivatives – A Cross-
Country Comparison of Corporate Bond Funds under U.S. and German 
Regulation" by Dominika Paula Gałkiewicz, March 2015. 
018 "Manager Characteristics and Credit Derivative Use by U.S. Corporate 
Bond Funds" by Dominika Paula Gałkiewicz, March 2015. 
019 "Measuring Connectedness of Euro Area Sovereign Risk" by Rebekka 
Gätjen Melanie Schienle, April 2015. 
020 "Is There an Asymmetric Impact of Housing on Output?" by Tsung-Hsien 
Michael Lee and Wenjuan Chen, April 2015. 
021 "Characterizing the Financial Cycle: Evidence from a Frequency Domain 







SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 






SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2015 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 




022 "Risk Related Brain Regions Detected with 3D Image FPCA" by Ying 
Chen, Wolfgang K. Härdle, He Qiang and Piotr Majer, April 2015. 
023 "An Adaptive Approach to Forecasting Three Key Macroeconomic Varia-
bles for Transitional China" by Linlin Niu, Xiu Xu and Ying Chen, April 
2015. 
024 "How Do Financial Cycles Interact? Evidence from the US and the UK" by 
Till Strohsal, Christian R. Proaño, Jürgen Wolters, April 2015. 
025 "Employment Polarization and Immigrant Employment Opportunities" by 
Hanna Wielandt, April 2015. 
026 "Forecasting volatility of wind power production" by Zhiwei Shen and 
Matthias Ritter, May 2015. 
027 "The Information Content of Monetary Statistics for the Great Recession: 
Evidence from Germany" by Wenjuan Chen and Dieter Nautz, May 2015. 
028 "The Time-Varying Degree of Inflation Expectations Anchoring" by Till 
Strohsal, Rafi Melnick and Dieter Nautz, May 2015. 
029 "Change point and trend analyses of annual expectile curves of tropical 
storms" by P.Burdejova, W.K.Härdle, P.Kokoszka and Q.Xiong, May 
2015. 
030 "Testing for Identification in SVAR-GARCH Models" by Helmut Luetkepohl 
and George Milunovich, June 2015. 
031 "Simultaneous likelihood-based bootstrap confidence sets for a large 
number of models" by Mayya Zhilova, June 2015. 
032 "Government Bond Liquidity and Sovereign-Bank Interlinkages" by 
Sören Radde, Cristina Checherita-Westphal and Wei Cui, July 2015. 
033 "Not Working at Work: Loafing, Unemployment and Labor Productivity" 
by Michael C. Burda, Katie Genadek and Daniel S. Hamermesh, July 
2015. 
034 "Factorisable Sparse Tail Event Curves" by Shih-Kang Chao, Wolfgang K. 
Härdle and Ming Yuan, July 2015. 
035 "Price discovery in the markets for credit risk: A Markov switching ap-
proach" by Thomas Dimpfl and Franziska J. Peter, July 2015. 
036 "Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard - a mechanism 





SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschun sgemeinschaft throug  the SFB 649 "Ec nomic Risk". 
 
